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ABSTRACT
Although tsunamis have the potential to be extremely destructive, relatively little research on tsunami
messaging has taken place. Discovering whether tsunami warning messages can be written in a way that leads
to increased protective response is crucial, particularly given the increased use of mobilemessage services and
the role they play in notifying the public of imminent threats such as tsunami and other hazards. The purpose
of this study was to examine the possibility of designing warning messages for tsunamis that improve upon
message style and content used by public alerting agencies to date and to gain insight that can be applied to
other hazards. This study tested the impact of tsunami messages that varied in length and content on six
message outcomes—understanding, believing, personalizing, deciding, milling, and fear. Relative to the short
message, revised messages resulted in significantly more understanding and deciding, known precursors to
taking protective action under threat. The revised message also resulted in significantly more fear, which is
believed to influence behavioral intentions. Findings suggest that shorter messages may not deliver enough
content to informmessage receivers about the threat they face and the protective actions they should perform.
Longer messages delivered with more specific information about the location of impact, threat-associated
risks, and recommended protective actions were associated with better message outcomes, including quicker
intended response. Recommendations for future tsunami warnings are provided.
1. Introduction
In the last five decades, a number of significant tsu-
namis have occurred worldwide, capturing the interest
of international agencies tasked with motivating pre-
paredness for tsunamis and warning the public at risk.
Tsunamis usually occur after significant underwater
earthquakes or landslides and consist of a series of
powerful ocean waves. In December 2004, a magnitude-
9.0 earthquake in the Indian Ocean created a tsunami
that resulted in more than 225 000 deaths. In March
2011, an earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Japan
resulted in more than 15 000 deaths and one of the worst
nuclear disasters to date. Although the United States
has not experienced a significant tsunami recently, both
Hawaii (1960 Hilo Tsunami) and Alaska (1964 Good
Friday Earthquake) have experienced destructive tsu-
namis within the last 100 years resulting in preventable
loss of life had adequate warning systems been in place
(National Research Council 2011b). Furthermore, the
potential exists for destructive tsunamis along much of
the Pacific West Coast (Geist et al. 2004) where sizable
coastal populations are placed at risk (Wood 2007;
Wood and Soulard 2008).
Previous research has established that warning mes-
sages have the potential to reduce life loss during severe
events like tsunamis by encouraging individuals to take
protective action (Mileti and Sorensen 1990; Lindell and
Prater 2010). However, little research provides guidance
for the design and content of effective tsunami warning
messages. Although much research has been conducted
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on warnings in general (Mileti and Sorensen 1990),
only a handful of studies have focused on tsunami
warning messages, including their content, style, and
structure (Gregg et al. 2012a; Sutton and Woods 2016).
In addition, the changing media environment—in par-
ticular the advent of short message systems—has
changed the ways in which warning messages can be
sent. Much of the prior research on warnings assumes
that officials will use the Emergency Alerting System
(EAS), which has a relatively long message capacity
(1380 characters; Drabek 1999). However, warning
messages are increasingly sent on social media plat-
forms, such as Twitter, which restricts messages to 140
characters, and the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA)
service, which sends 90-character, geographically tar-
geted messages directly to individual mobile phones
(National Research Council 2011a). For tsunamis, es-
pecially those triggered by major, near-field sources,
which offer little time to take protective action, short
messaging systems that deliver content to geotargeted
areasmay be a primary strategy for warning populations at
risk (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
2016). Such platforms allow messages to reach people
quickly and can potentially increase the amount of time
people have available to take protective action. Unfor-
tunately, only one study that we know of has examined
the effectiveness of these shorter messages compared to
longer messages (Wood et al. 2015), and it did not focus
on tsunamis.
In this paper, we build upon existing research by
testing tsunami messages for a distant-source tsunami
with members of the public. In doing so, we expand
Mileti’s (1999) warning response model to include
message length, as a feature of message style, and fear,
as an affective response to message content. Based on
our findings, we identify messaging strategies to improve
the effectiveness of future tsunami warnings.
2. Literature review
a. Research on tsunami warning messages
There has been considerable research on understand-
ing tsunami risk perception (Anderson 1969; Johnston
et al. 2005), preparedness (Lindell and Prater 2010), and
response to recent events (Wilson et al. 2011, 2013). How-
ever, in 2011, theNationalResearchCouncil of theNational
Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted a review on
tsunami warning and preparedness and identified a
lack of research on evidence-based messages (National
Research Council 2011b); specifically focusing on message
design features including message content that has
demonstrated likelihood for increasing protective action
taking among those at risk. While preevent education
about natural cues, personal preparedness, and response,
such as plans for evacuation and reunification, is vitally
important for decreasing loss of life during a local source
tsunami event (Johnston et al. 2005; Esteban et al. 2013),
preparedness efforts must be supplemented by warning
messages that can persuade individuals to act quickly for
both local-source and distant-source tsunami events. The
NAS report also noted the need for research onmessages
delivered via next-generation technologies such as mo-
bile devices or social media applications that can extend
the reach of messages across networks.
Since thenGregg et al. (2012) andC.Gregg et al. (2012,
unpublished report) undertook two studies on behalf of
the NOAA tsunami program. The first included focus
groups with community stakeholders including leaders in
business, government, civic organizations, and emer-
gency response agencies, including emergency managers
(Gregg et al. 2012). In this study, participants rated the
characteristics of the content and style of tsunami bulle-
tins, discussed the strengths and weaknesses of existing
message products, and identified sources and channels by
which they had previously received tsunami information.
The second study was an evaluative review of 37 NOAA
tsunami products, including warning messages, conduct-
ed by a team of social scientists. Based on the variables
identified in the warning response model (Mileti and
Sorensen 1990), the investigators developed a ‘‘tsunami
message metric’’ consisting of 21 factors that described
message content, style, order, formatting, and receiver
characteristics (C. Gregg et al. 2012, unpublished report).
Together, these two studies resulted in recommended
changes to 1) message formatting and organization of
existing material (Gregg et al. 2012) and 2) content order
and style to improve readability (C. Gregg et al. 2012,
unpublished report). Suggested changes includedmoving
the ‘‘most important information’’ up front in the mes-
sage (Gregg et al. 2012, p. ii) and using clearer language
for recommended actions and expected impacts of a
tsunami (C. Gregg et al. 2012, unpublished report).
More recently, Sutton and Woods (2016) conducted
focus group research with members of the public to
identify gaps in sense making about tsunami warning
messages. Focus group participants, none of whom had
any direct experience with tsunami, reviewed an NWS
tsunami message that had previously been distributed to
populations at risk along the coast of Northern Cal-
ifornia during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (a distant
source tsunami) and discussed their cognitive and
emotional responses to message content and style
characteristics. Findings from the focus groups were
consistent with those reported byGregg et al. (2012) and
C. Gregg et al. (2012, unpublished report). Focus group
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participants consistently expressed confusion about the
hazard threat, hazard impact, and recommended pro-
tective actions owing to the lack of details about the
potential severity of tsunamis and their personal sus-
ceptibility. Furthermore, they indicated that the lack of
specificity in describing the location of impact signifi-
cantly affected their ability to make a decision about
taking action. That is, they were unable to determine
whether they were personally susceptible to the threat.
In addition, several participants reported feeling ex-
tremely anxious owing to their inability to determine
whether they or their loved ones were personally at risk.
b. Warning messages
The goal of a warning message is to overcome peo-
ple’s belief in their own safety (i.e., the optimism bias)
and then guide them to take protective actions
(Burningham et al. 2008). Prior research on warnings for
imminent threats and disaster has shown that effective
messages result in a series of cognitive shifts as in-
dividuals make sense of changing situations and that
influence their intent to take protective action (Lindell
and Perry 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 1990). These shifts
begin as individuals 1) understand what the warning
means for them, 2) believe the risk, and 3) personalize
the risk. These shifts occur in the context of 4) milling,
that is, searching for and confirming information, re-
sulting in a 5) decision to take protective action. Mileti
(1999) argued that public warning systems that take
these mental and social processes into account are more
likely to help at-risk publics.
Understanding is the process of comprehending the
meaning of the message (Drost et al. 2016). Believing
the message is to trust that what is being communicated
is accurate (Mileti and Peek 2000). Personalization is the
process of individuals’ recognizing that they are sus-
ceptible to the threat (Wood et al. 2017; Nigg 1987).
Personalization plays a crucial role in warning response
as it has been linked to an increased likelihood of taking
protective action (Casteel 2016; Mileti and Peek 2000;
Perry 1979; Perry et al. 1981). Throughout the warning
period, message receivers have an increased likelihood
of engaging in milling. Milling consists of informal in-
teractions with others to search for additional in-
formation (Drabek 1986; Lindell and Perry 2004, 2012).
Finally, message receivers decide what action to take in
response to the warning message (Wood et al. 2017).
The warning response model does not, however,
consider how fear affects these cognitive shifts and what
role this emotion may play in the decision to take pro-
tective action. Fear is a negative emotion that is accom-
panied by high levels of arousal (Witte 1992). It is often
operationalized as feeling anxious (at lower levels).
Warnings have the potential to evoke anxiety, especially
if individuals are confused by the message (Sutton and
Woods 2016). For example, in one study, focus group
participants indicated that the lack of specificity in the
location of impact significantly affected their ability to
make a decision about taking action. As a result, partic-
ipants could not determine if they were personally sus-
ceptible to the threat. This inability to determine the
personal impact of the threat resulted in verbal expres-
sions of anxiety and fear. The emotional responsewas not
due to the content that was present in the message, but
rather, what was absent. Those expressing fear said they
would need to seek additional information to confirm the
impact (Sutton andWoods 2016). While research on fear
appeals, guided by Witte’s (1994) extended parallel pro-
cessing model (EPPM), suggests that fear may be a moti-
vating emotion (Witte 1992; Peters et al. 2013), especially
when individuals believe that they know how to take
protective action (i.e., perceived efficacy), the relationship
between fear and warning messages has yet to be studied.
The research record on warning messages demon-
strates that the intrinsic features of warning messages
influence the nonaffective cognitive shifts described
above (e.g., Bean et al. 2016; Mileti and O’Brien 1992).
This body of research suggests that warning messages
that contain five key content features (i.e., hazard, guid-
ance, location, time, and source) are more effective. As
these features are described in detail elsewhere (Mileti
and Sorensen 1990), we provide brief definitions here.
Effectivemessages must contain information about the
hazard including a description of physical characteristics
of the threat, as well as its potential impact and effects
(Covello 1998; Drabek 1999; Mileti and Peek 2000).
Warning messages should also provide guidance, which
includes information about the actions people need to
take to increase their safety (Lindell andPerry, 1992;Mileti
and Sorensen 1990). Public warning messages must also
identify the location of the threat, including the geo-
graphical and physical boundaries (Greene et al. 1981;
Nigg 1987) and the populations at risk. Messages should
contain information about time, that is, when individuals
need to initiate protective actions and the amount of time
they have available in which to do so (Drabek and Boggs
1968; Perry et al. 1981; Mileti and Sorensen 1990). And
finally, messages must also indicate the source or sources
initiating and sending the warning (Casteel 2016;Mayhorn
and McLaughlin 2014).
In addition to these content variables, the style of the
warning affects message interpretation (Mileti and Peek
2000). According to the warning response model, the style
of warnings should be specific, in that the warning should
provide precise information anddetails (DrabekandBoggs
1968;Mayhorn andMcLaughlin 2014;Mileti and Sorensen
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1990). Warnings should be consistent within and across
messages (Mileti and Peek 2000;Mileti and Sorensen 1990).
Messages should employ clear language that is simple and
straightforward (Drabek and Stephenson 1971; Quarantelli
1984). Information also should be conveyed with certainty,
even when the actual impact may be uncertain and condi-
tions are changing (Mileti andPeek 2000). Finally,messages
should be accurate in that the information is timely and
complete (Mileti and Sorensen 1990).
c. New warning technologies and message length
One feature of warning messages that has become
particularly relevant because of evolving technologies is
the length (National Research Council 2011a). Al-
though WEA- and Twitter-based warning messages
have the potential to reach people quickly, the character
constraints of these systems (90 and 140, respectively)
force officials to write short messages. Logistically, these
messages may not contain enough characters to allow
emergency managers to include the five types of content
identified by the warning response model (Mileti 1999).
Existing research on short messages has found that rel-
ative to longer 1380-character messages, shorter messages
resulted in poorer message outcomes (Bean et al. 2014,
2016). A recent study (Wood et al. 2017) found that the
amount of information contained in a message was posi-
tively associated withmessage understanding and deciding
and negatively associated with response delay.
One possible solution is to use the distributed practice
strategy (Seabrook et al. 2005; Underwood 1961). This
strategy suggests that sequenced presentation of informa-
tion yields better understanding thanmassed presentation,
or cramming. In the context of Twitter orWEAmessages,
this strategywould require that longermessages be broken
up into a series of digestible, sequencedmessages. Breaking
upmessagesmaymake themeasier to understand.Wogalter
and Mayhorn (2005) argued that safety-related informa-
tion could be learned, or understood,more efficiently when
presented in shortened presentations distributed across
time. Taken together, this research suggests that sequenced
messages should be as effective as nonsequenced messages
and more effective than short messages.
In this study, we advance research on warning messages
in general, and on tsunami warningmessages in particular,
by examining the ways in which message content and
length affect 1) key outcomes of the warning response
model and 2) the affective outcome, fear, an understudied
emotional reaction to warning messages.
3. Method
An online experiment comparing outcomes for four
different public tsunami warning messages was conducted
using a posttest only, between-subjects design. Participants
gave informed consent and then were presented with one
of four randomly assigned warning messages about a
distant-source tsunami event off the California coast. All
fourmessages informed the participants about the tsunami
and encouraged them to take protective action. After
viewing the randomly assigned message, participants were
asked to imagine how they would feel if they had received
themessage on their phone andwere then asked a series of
questions. The study protocol was approved by the In-
stitutional Review Board at a large university.
a. Participants
A volunteer sample (N 5 401) was drawn from an
online survey audience panel of individuals recruited for
experiment participation in exchange for ‘‘points’’ in a
no-cash, point system of rewards, including sweepstakes
and merchandise. The panel included a diverse group of
individuals who have Internet access and have joined the
audience panel to take surveys. Eligible panel members
were invited by e-mail to participate, and invitations
were sent to provide general balance in terms of gender.
To be eligible to participate in this study, individuals had
to be 1) 18 years of age or older, 2) U.S. residents, and
3) English speakers.
Given that the tested messages were about a hypo-
thetical tsunami occurring in California, most partici-
pants (96%) were drawn from within the state, largely
from coastal regions. Warning messages may be re-
ceived by nonresident visitors to a given area; thus
additional participants were drawn from out of state
(4%) to reflect visitors to coastal areas who may be
unfamiliar with the tsunami hazard. In general, de-
mographic characteristics were similar to those of Cal-
ifornia residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2017), although
Hispanic residents were underrepresented. Demographic
characteristics of the sample are provided (Table 1). Just
over half the participants were women (54%); themedian
age was 38 years. The majority (54%; n 5 215) self-
identified as white, 21% (n 5 84) as Hispanic/Latino,
15% (n5 62) as Asian/Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander,
7% (n 5 27) as black or African American, and 3%
(n 5 13) as some other group.
b. Materials
Four messages were tested: 1) an actual federal
agency message (‘‘standard’’), 2) a revised specificity-
and clarity-enhanced message (‘‘revised’’), 3) a short,
length-constrained message (‘‘constrained’’), and 4) the
specificity- and clarity-enhanced revisedmessage delivered
as a sequenced set of shortermessages (‘‘sequenced’’). The
standard message was an actual distant-source tsunami
warning message that was issued by the National Weather
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Service in Eureka, California, on 11 March 2011, in
response to the Tohoku Tsunami event that occurred
off the coast of Japan and provided the basis for dis-
cussion in prior focus group research (Sutton and
Woods 2016). This message served as the control. The
revised message was a revision of the standard NWS
message based on the findings from four focus groups
held in October 2014 (Sutton and Woods 2016). The
revised message included changes to specify charac-
teristics about the hazard threat and potential impact,
clearly identify the location of impact using city names,
and specify the recommended protective actions. The
message content was also reorganized to improve
message clarity and specificity, per the warning re-
sponse model (Mileti and Sorensen 1990). The con-
strained message was a 140-character warning message
that included all five content features in a condensed
form. The sequenced message was the revised warning
message presented as a sequence of eleven 140-character
messages. All messages were written in capital letters to
mimic NWS style and were reviewed by an outside ex-
pert. See the appendix for message text.
c. Procedure and data analysis
After informed consent procedures, participants were
presented with the following scenario:
Imagine that you are on vacation on the coast in Hum-
boldt, California. It’s 10:20 in themorning. You are home
alone, and you just received the following message on
your mobile/cellular phone. (If you do not have a mobile/
cell phone, imagine that you do.) This is what you see
when you view the message.
Participants were then presented with an image of a cell
phone containing a randomly assigned message (stan-
dard, revised, constrained, or sequenced). After reading
TABLE 1. Sample Characteristics.
Conditiona
Total
(N 5 401)
Standard
(n 5 113)
Revised
(n 5 111)
Constrained
(n593)
Sequenced
(n 5 84)
Characteristic n % n % n % n % n %
Sex
Male 183 46 52 46 41 37 51 55 39 46
Female 218 54 61 54 70 63 42 45 45 54
Race/ethnicity
African American/black 27 7 10 9 6 5 3 3 8 10
Asian 62 15 13 12 23 21 17 18 9 11
Hispanic/Latino 84 21 25 22 23 21 20 22 16 19
White 215 54 60 53 58 52 48 52 49 58
Other 13 3 5 4 1 1 5 5 2 2
Ageb
Younger (18–54 years) 339 84 98 87 100 90 73 78 68 81
Older (551 years) 62 16 15 13 11 10 20 22 16 19
Income
$0–$74,999 240 60 70 62 70 63 52 56 48 57
$75,000 and more 161 40 43 38 41 37 41 44 36 43
Live in California
Yes 386 96 111 98 107 96 86 92 82 98
No 15 4 2 2 4 4 7 8 2 2
Comfort using cell phone
No 34 8 11 10 8 7 11 12 4 5
Yes 367 92 102 90 103 93 82 88 80 95
Disaster experience
Low 156 39 42 37 42 38 34 37 38 45
High 245 61 71 63 69 62 59 63 46 55
Prior mobile alert
Yes 252 63 70 62 73 66 52 56 57 68
No 149 37 43 38 38 34 41 44 27 32
a 2
(N-1 DF) was nonsignificant for each participant characteristic, indicating that there were no baseline differences between treatment groups.
bMedian age was 38 years.
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the message, participants completed a questionnaire that
measured six primary outcomes (understanding, belief,
personalization, deciding, milling, and fear). Standard
questionnaire items used in prior research (Gutteling 1993;
Lindell and Perry 2012) were employed when they existed
and there was evidence that the items had performed well.
Existing items were adapted to the context of the project.
OUTCOME SCALES
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis was
conducted to create composite mean outcome scores for
four of the six outcomes (understanding, belief, per-
sonalization, and fear). Two measures (deciding and
milling) were measured as single items. Principal com-
ponent analysis and oblimin rotation was used to assess
whether items reliably represented a single construct.
Six scales were extracted. Coefficient alpha values
ranged from 0.92 to 0.95. Descriptive statistics for the
outcome scales are presented in Table 2.
d. Measures
1) UNDERSTANDING
The understanding scale measured how well in-
dividuals thought they understood the message. The
scale included seven items: ‘‘After reading this message,
I understand: 1) what happened, 2) the risks, 3) what to
do to protect myself, 4) what location is affected, 5) who
the message is from, 6) when I am supposed to take
action to protect myself, and 7) how long I am supposed
to continue taking action to protect myself.’’ Each of the
items was rated on a 6-point scale, where 1 5 Do not
understand at all and 6 5 Understand fully.
2) BELIEF
The belief scale included three items. The specific
wording was: ‘‘After reading this message, do you be-
lieve that: 1) A tsunami is headed your way? 2) You
should immediately move to high ground? and
3) Moving to high ground will make you safer?’’ Each of
the items was rated on a 6-point scale, where 15Do not
believe and 6 5 Believe.
3) PERSONALIZATION
The personalization scale included seven items. The
specific wording was: ‘‘If I received this message on
my cell phone, I would think that: 1) I might become
injured, 2) people I know might become injured,
3) people I do not knowmight become injured, 4) I might
die, 5) people I know might die, 6) people I do not
know might die, and 7) the message was meant for
me.’’ Each of the items was rated on a 6-point scale,
where 1 5 Extremely unlikely and 6 5 Extremely
likely.
4) MILLING
Participants were asked one question that tapped into
their willingness to engage in quick, efficient, protective
behaviors: ‘‘How likely would you be to take action to
protect yourself before confirming the information
somewhere else?’’ This item was rated on a 6-point
scale, where 1 5 Very unlikely and 6 5 Very likely.
Higher scores indicated less milling and quicker
protective action.
5) TIME TO TAKE PROTECTIVE ACTION
Participants were also asked ‘‘Howmuch time did you
believe you had before you should begin taking ac-
tions?’’ Each participant indicated their response in
hours and minutes, and data were converted to one total
score in minutes.
6) DECIDING
Deciding was measured with one item: ‘‘The message
will helpme decide what to do.’’ This itemwas rated on a
6-point scale, where 1 5 Strongly disagree and 6 5
Strongly agree.
7) FEAR
Participants rated four items (afraid, scared, anxious,
frightened) using a 7-point rating scale where 1 5 None
of this feeling and 7 5 A great deal of this feeling. These
four items converged to form a mean scale labeled as
‘‘Fear.’’
TABLE 2. Scale descriptive statistics (N 5 401).
Scale Mean Std dev Skew Kurtosis No. of items Cronbach’s a
Understanding 4.70 1.13 20.89 0.59 7 0.94
Belief 4.81 1.25 21.28 1.43 3 0.92
Personalization 4.34 1.29 20.63 20.06 7 0.94
Milling 4.55 1.37 20.97 0.37 1 —
Deciding 4.76 1.33 21.06 0.62 1 —
Minutes to take action 155.11 113.76 1.38 0.96 2 —
Fear 4.78 1.67 20.54 20.33 3 0.95
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e. Data analysis
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
assess the effect of messages on each outcome. Post hoc
analysis was conducted using Scheffe’s test (Tabachnick
and Fidell 2007), except in cases where the homogeneity
of variance assumption was violated. Cell sizes were
relatively equal. Although ANOVA is typically robust
in the presence of violations, the Games–Howell pro-
cedure were employed in those cases, as this test was
designed for situations involving unequal variances
(Field 2013).
4. Results
One-way ANOVAwas used to examine whether self-
reported understanding, belief, personalization, milling,
deciding, and fear were functions of the type of message
viewed. The independent variable represented the
four different message types: 1) standard, 2) revised,
3) constrained, and 4) sequenced. The dependent vari-
ables were understanding, belief, personalization, mill-
ing, deciding, and fear scores. See Table 3 for means and
standard deviations for each of the four groups.
a. Understanding
There was a significant effect of message type on un-
derstanding (F [3, 397] 5 6.851; p , 0.001; hp
2 5 0.05).
This effect can be characterized as small to medium.
Games–Howell post hoc results indicated that the con-
strained message (M 5 4.27; SD 5 1.32) resulted in less
understanding than the standard message (M 5 4.73;
SD5 0.94; p5 0.003), revised message (M5 4.95; SD5
1.03; p , 0.001), and sequenced message (M 5 4.82;
SD 5 1.15; p 5 0.001). The revised message did not
cause significantly more understanding than the stan-
dard or sequenced message; however, examination of
the means showed slightly more understanding for the
revised and the sequenced messages than the standard
message.
b. Belief
There also was a significant effect of message type on
belief (F [3, 397]5 2.77; p5 0.04; hp
2 5 0.02). However,
Games–Howell post hoc tests did not indicate significant
differences between messages. The differences between
the revised message (M 5 5.05; SD 5 1.04) and the
standard message (M5 4.68; SD5 1.16; p5 0.055) and
between the revised message and the constrained mes-
sage (M 5 4.61; SD 5 1.44; p 5 0.069) approached sig-
nificance. Examination of the means showed that the
revised message resulted in the highest levels of belief,
followed by the sequenced message, the original mes-
sage, and the constrained message.
c. Personalization
There was no effect of message type on personaliza-
tion (F [3, 397] 5 1.25; p 5 0.29; hp
2 5 0.009), indicating
that people who received different types of messages
personalized the warnings in a similar manner. Person-
alization was high (above 4.2) in all conditions.
d. Milling
There was no effect of message type on milling
(F [3, 397] 5 1.844; p 5 0.14; hp
2 5 0.014), indicating
that the message variations did not influence whether
participants would engage in confirming the message
before taking protective action. Notably, in all message
conditions, individuals indicated high levels of intent to
take protective action (4.32 or above) before confirming.
Participants in the sequenced condition indicated the
highest level of taking protective action before con-
firming (M5 4.71; SD5 1.53), followed by the revised
(M 5 4.70; SD 5 1.24), standard (M 5 4.47; SD 5 1.33),
and constrained (M 5 4.32; SD 5 1.40) conditions.
e. Time to take protective action
There was a significant effect of message type on the
total number of minutes that participants believed were
TABLE 3. Mean message outcomes by group.
Scale
Standard
(n 5 113)
M (SD)
Revised
(n 5 111)
M (SD)
Constrained
(n 5 93)
M (SD)
Sequenced
(n 5 84)
M (SD)
Understanding 4.73a (0.94) 4.95a (1.03) 4.27b (1.32) 4.82a (1.15)
Belief 4.68 (1.16) 5.05 (1.04) 4.61 (1.44) 4.89 (1.34)
Personalization 4.20 (1.14) 4.40 (1.32) 4.26 (1.41) 4.53 (1.30)
Milling 4.47 (1.33) 4.70 (1.24) 4.32 (1.40) 4.71 (1.53)
Minutes to take action 155.79 (109.17) 126.39 (85.88) 174.31 (118.74) 166.17 (142.31)
Deciding 4.66 (1.16) 5.06a (1.24) 4.41b (1.47) 4.86 (1.42)
Fear 4.71 (1.52) 5.13a (1.45) 4.41b (1.86) 4.81 (1.83)
Means with differing superscripts are significantly different at the p , 0.05 level.
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available in which to take protective action to protect
themselves (F [3, 397] 5 3.186; p 5 0.024; hp
2 5 0.024).
However, Games–Howell post hoc tests did not indicate
significant differences between message conditions, al-
though differences between the constrained condition
(M 5 174.31; SD 5 118.74) and the revised condition
(M 5 126.39; SD 5 85.88; p 5 0.081), and between the
constrained condition and the sequenced condition
(M 5 166.17; SD 5 142.31; p 5 0.082) approached sig-
nificance. In general, participants indicated that they
would act relatively quickly (responding within two to
three hours).
f. Deciding
There was a significant effect of message type on de-
ciding (F [3, 397]5 4.5; p5 0.004;hp
25 0.033), indicating
participants did vary significantly in their perceived
ability to make a decision as a result of the message
conditions. Games–Howell post hoc tests indicated that
participants receiving the revised message reported
significantly more ability to decide whether to take
protective action (M 5 5.06; SD 5 1.24) than partici-
pants receiving the constrained message (M 5 4.41;
SD 5 1.47; p 5 0.005) and participants receiving
the original message (M5 4.66; SD5 1.16), although this
latter difference only approached significance (p5 0.066).
g. Fear
There was a significant effect of message type on fear
(F [3, 397] 5 3.303; p 5 0.02; hp
2 5 0.024). Games–
Howell post hoc tests indicated that the revised message
caused significantly more fear (M 5 5.13; SD 5 1.45)
compared to the constrained message (M 5 4.41; SD 5
1.86; p5 0.014). However, fear did not vary significantly
among other message conditions.
5. Discussion
Effective tsunami warnings are essential to limit the
loss of life that may occur when these events happen.
The results from this study suggest that existing tsunami
warning messages can be improved by including more
specific information about the geographical location and
population under threat, clearly explaining the potential
impact of tsunami, and providing specific guidance
about protective actions that should be taken by pop-
ulations at risk. Although the effect sizes are small, when
applied across the large populations that may need to be
reached in the event of a catastrophic tsunami, these
changes have the potential to increase protective action
measures taken by the public and save lives. While this
research was conducted on a distant-source tsunami
threat, prior research (Bean et al. 2016; Lindell and
Perry 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 1990) suggests that our
findings likely apply to other hazards in general as well
as those with short response times that require quick
decision-making with little time to seek additional
information.
Furthermore, the results provide insight into using
short messages to communicate warnings. These results
suggest that while a single, short message may have
some effect, this type of message is not as successful as
messages that include more information. In this study,
participants who only saw a single, short message re-
ported significantly less understanding, fear, and ability
to decide, compared to participants who received the
revised message.
This result, however, should not be interpreted to
mean that warnings should not be sent via short mes-
sages such as Twitter or WEA. Rather, it may be more
effective to send short messages in a distributed fashion
on these message systems. Our results showed that the
sequenced 140-character set ofmessages was as effective
as the revised, longer-length message. Thus, even when
technology limits the length of messages, our findings
demonstrate that public officials can send messages to
mobile devices in a way that circumvents these con-
straints by sending a series of related messages that in-
clude more information than a single shorter message
and are more effective. To our knowledge, this research
is the first to have demonstrated the potential value of
sequenced warning messages.
Our finding that longer messages that included more
information had better outcomes is consistent with re-
search byWood et al. (2017), who examined the effect of
amount of information on outcomes for an improvised
nuclear device warning. Our study extends that research
by examining a different hazard type and by including
fear, an affective precursor to protective action. More-
over, our research compares three different approaches
to writing longer messages: 1) actual messages that are
sent by federal agencies, 2) actual messages that are
revised to enhance specificity and clarity, and 3) actual
messages that are revised to enhance specificity and
clarity and that are delivered as a sequenced set of
shorter messages.
Importantly, across all four message conditions, we
found no differential effects for intended milling, that
is, the desire to confirm the message before taking
protective action. In other words, message content
and length did not differentially affect people’s intent
to seek confirmation response to a tsunami warning
message. These data indicated that, overall, partici-
pants perceived strong intent to act, regardless of
which of the four randomly assigned messages they
had read.
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A key implication of this research is that it remains
imperative that emergency communicators continue to
develop mastery in writing messages that are not only
clear and succinct but that also convey the threat as well
as the necessary steps to mitigating the threat. This may
involve consideration of sending longer messages,
sending sequenced messages, including messages with
links to further information, and developing message
templates in advance that can be used as an event
unfolds.
6. Limitations and future research
There are some limitations to this study, which should
be addressed in future research. First, this study assessed
emotions, cognitive shifts, and behavioral intention in
response to an imagined scenario using a controlled
experimental design. The use of an experimental design,
which includes randomization to message condition,
helps reduce the likelihood that there will be baseline
differences between groups on participant characteris-
tics such as prior hazard knowledge (Babbie 2016). We
collected information about prior disaster experience
and found no differences between groups (see Table 1).
Owing to concerns about response burden, however, we
did not assess prior knowledge of the hazard; therefore,
we cannot be certain that there were no preexisting
group differences in tsunami knowledge. Although ex-
perimental designs maximize internal validity by con-
trolling for baseline differences between groups (Babbie
2016) and have been used successfully to investigate
warning messages (Frisby et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2017),
future research should investigate the effects of tsunami
warning messages during real-world events to strengthen
the external validity of our findings. Furthermore, this
scenario depicted a distant-source event, which would
allow for additional time for both the development of a
long form message that can be sent in a single shot or in
sequence. A local source event would not allow the de-
velopment of a long message, nor time for information
seeking before decision-making. Therefore, future re-
search is needed to investigate responses to near-field
tsunami messages. Likewise, future research should ex-
amine the effect of prior hazard knowledge on warning
outcomes.
Second, our focus has been on a single, largely un-
familiar hazard. Globally, few individuals have experi-
ence with this threat except vicariously through media
accounts of large-scale, high-impact events. In addition,
recommended protective actions for tsunami threat are
not terribly complicated; the goal for those at risk is to
get to higher ground as quickly as possible. In contrast,
people at risk from other hazards may have different
recommended protective actions depending upon their
location and protective structure. Therefore, future ex-
periments on warning message response for other haz-
ards, such as hurricane, flood, and tornado, or less
familiar hazards, such as technological threats, should
examine the effects of using shorter messages and se-
quenced messages.
Third, in this study, we considered two types of mes-
sage length—a long message and a constrainedmessage,
delivered as a single shot or a series of 11 messages. We
did not investigate the possibility of a middle-range
message that is longer than 140 characters and shorter
than a full 1380 characters. Future research should in-
vestigate the possibility of an optimal message length
that can increase intent to take protective action. Ad-
ditional testing should also be conducted on sequenced
messages delivered over constrained messaging chan-
nels. This study demonstrates that using sequenced
messages may be an effective strategy for delivering
warning messages. In this study, we numbered each
message in sequence (1/11, 2/11, etc.); however, future
research should investigate how participants might re-
spond if messages are sent out of order or if messages are
not complete, as these outcomes are distinct possibilities
when messages are sequenced. Likewise, research
should examine whether the number of messages in-
cluded in a sequenced set should be limited.
Fourth, this research investigated the effect of mes-
sages on emotions, specifically looking at fear. Our
findings indicated the presence of fear; however, be-
cause of concerns about respondent fatigue, we did not
assess how messages influenced perceived efficacy. Risk
communication scholarship suggests that fear, when
accompanied by high perceived efficacy, increases behav-
ioral intentions (Witte 1992); future research should ex-
amine whether warning messages can increase protective
action responses by increasing perceived efficacy.
7. Conclusions
When warningmembers of the public about imminent
threats, risk communicators intend for people to take
action immediately in response to the warning messages
they receive. Therefore, individuals must believe that
the threat is real, that they are at risk, and that they have
the information necessary to make a decision about how
to respond. Indeed, the goal of much hazard warning
research has been to increase the persuasiveness of
messages in order to reduce the time spent searching for
more information before engaging in protective action.
The hope has been that a specific combination of mes-
sage content and message style will lead to greater
compliance among those at risk, reducing the loss of life
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under severe conditions. Most importantly compliance
needs to be quick—action must happen fast.
Of great importance is the need for risk communica-
tors to deliver messages that are highly specific and clear
about the hazard threat, its impact, and the protective
actions that should be taken, regardless of message
length. Messages must be understandable and useful for
people with varying levels of education and ability.
Furthermore, as risk communicators continue to use
channels that transmit shorter messages in order to relay
warnings in real time, greater attention should be given
to strategies to make these short messages more effec-
tive. In this study, a single, content-constrained warning
message, such as a 140-character message sent as a single
message, was the least successful strategy for delivering a
warning that would be understood or believed. The re-
sults of this study suggest that a series of short messages
may serve as a viable alternative for delivering additional
information that can help people tomake decisions about
how to protect themselves. In light of this finding, public
communicators utilizing short messaging channels should
consider sending a series of messages rather than a single
message under conditions of imminent threat. Additional
research is critical to help clarify when and how se-
quenced messages can be most effective in reducing
death and injury.
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APPENDIX
Message 1: Original Tsunami Message
WWUS86 KEKA 111820
SPSEKA
SPECIAL WEATHER STATEMENT
NATIONALWEATHER SERVICE EUREKACA
1020 a.m. PST FRI MAR 11 2011
CAZ001–002–120030-
REDWOOD COAST-MENDOCINO COAST-
1020 a.m. PST FRI MAR 11 2011
. . .A TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN
EFFECT FOR DEL NORTE. . .HUMBOLDT AND
MENDOCINO COUNTIES COASTAL AREAS. . .
EARTHQUAKE DATA. PRELIMINARY
MAGNITUDE 8.9. LOCATION 38.2 NORTH 142.5
EAST. NEAR EAST COAST OF HONSHU JAPAN.
TIME 21:46 PST MAR 10, 2015. A TSUNAMI WAS
GENERATED AND HAS CAUSED DAMAGED
ALONGTHEDELNORTECOUNTY,ANDDAMAGE
ALONG THE HUMBOLDT AND MENDOCINO
COASTS IS STILL EXPECTED. PERSONS AT THE
COAST SHOULD BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS
FROM LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS.
DAMAGINGWAVESHAVEBEENOBSERVED
ACROSS HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. DAMAGING
WAVES HAVE ARRIVED AT CRESCENT CITY
HARBOR WHERE ALL DOCKS HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED. WAVES HAVE BROKEN OVER
THE SPIT AT STONE LAGOON. A 3-FOOTWAVE
HAS BEEN REPORTED IN HUMBOLDT BAY.
A 2–4 FOOT FLOOD WAVE WAS REPORTED
MOVING UP THE MAD RIVER AT 08:45 a.m. PST.
DAMAGINGWAVESWILLCONTINUEFORTHE
NEXT SEVERAL HOURS.
MEASUREMENTS OR REPORTS OF TSUNAMI
WAVE ACTIVITY GAUGE LOCATION TIME
AMPLITUDE
CRESCENT CITY, CA 08:44 a.m. 8.1 FT, NORTH
SPIT HUMBOLDT 8:30 a.m. 3.1 FT, ARENA COVE
09:17 a.m. 5.3 FT.
REMEMBER. . .DO NOT BE FOOLED. . .TSUNAMI
WAVES CAN SEEM TO STOP FOR LONG PE-
RIODS AND THEN BEGIN AGAIN. WAIT FOR
THE OFFICIAL ALL CLEAR TO RETURN TO
THREATENED AREAS.
IN DEL NORTE COUNTY. . .PEOPLE ARE
ORDERED TO EVACUATE TO ABOVE 9TH
STREET. SHELTER LOCATIONS INCLUDE SMITH
RIVER ELEMENTARY. . .DEL NORTE HIGH
SCHOOL AND YUROK TRIBAL OFFICE IN
KLAMATH.
IN HUMBOLDT AND MENDOCINO COUNTIES. . .
PEOPLE ARE ADVISED TO STAY OFF
BEACHES. . .NOT TRAVEL BY WATERCRAFT
AND EVACUATE LOW LYING COASTAL
AREAS IMMEDIATELY UNTIL ADVISED
THAT IT IS SAFE TO RETURN.
PEOPLE SHOULDSTAYCLEAROFLOWLYING
AREAS ALONG COASTAL RIVERS AS TSUNAMI
WAVES CAN TRAVEL UP FROM THE MOUTH
OF COASTAL RIVERS.
BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED HOURLY OR
SOONER IF CONDITIONS WARRANT TO KEEP
YOU INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THIS
EVENT. IF AVAILABLE. . .REFER TO THE
INTERNET SITE HTTP://TSUNAMI.GOV FOR
MORE INFORMATION.
DUE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING CONDITIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH TSUNAMI WAVE
ACTIVITY. . .LISTENERS ARE URGED TO TUNE
TO LOCAL EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM
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MEDIA FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION
ISSUED BY LOCAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
AUTHORITIES. THEY WILL PROVIDE DETAILS
ONTHEEVACUATIONOFLOW-LYINGAREAS. . .IF
NECESSARY. . .ANDWHEN IT IS SAFE TORETURN
AFTER THE TSUNAMI HAS PASSED.
Message 2: EPPM-Enhanced Tsunami Message
NATIONALWEATHER SERVICE EUREKACA.
AN EARTHQUAKE WITH A PRELIMINARY
MAGNITUDE OF 8.9 OCCURRED NEAR THE
EAST COAST OF HONSHU, JAPAN AT 11:46 p.m.
PST MAR 10, 2015. IT HAS GENERATED A
TSUNAMI. INITIAL WAVES WERE DETECTED
AT 08:30 a.m. PDT MAR 11, 2015. DOCKS HAVE
BEENDESTROYEDATCRESCENTCITYHARBOR.
DAMAGING WAVES HAVE BEEN SIGHTED IN
HUMBOLDT BAY AND MOVING UP THE MAD
RIVER.OTHERWAVESWILLSTRIKEOVERMANY
HOURS. TSUNAMI WAVES CAN BE DEADLY AND
CAUSE INJURYANDWIDESPREADDAMAGE.
THETSUNAMIWARNINGREMAINS IN EFFECT
FORDELNORTE,HUMBOLDT,ANDMENDOCINO
COUNTY COASTAL AREAS. THIS INCLUDES
THE TOWNS OF CRESCENT CITY, KLAMATH,
EUREKA, ARCATA, TRINIDAD, FORT BRAGG,
GUALALA, AND WESTPORT.
IF YOU ARE ON OR NEAR A BEACH, IN A
LOW LYING COASTAL AREA, OR NEAR A
COASTAL RIVER ANYWHERE IN THE DEL
NORTE,HUMBOLDT,ANDMENDOCINOCOUNTY
COASTAL AREAS, YOU WILL BE SAFEST IF
YOU IMMEDIATELY GET TO HIGH GROUND
OF AT LEAST 50 FEET OR MORE. IF YOU
CANNOT REACH HIGH GROUND, EVACUATE
TO AN UPPER FLOOR OF A HIGH RISE
BUILDING, IF ONE IS AVAILABLE. DO NOT
TRAVEL BY WATERCRAFT. TSUNAMI WAVES
MAY BE FILLED WITH DEBRIS, WHICH CAN
INJURE OR KILL PEOPLE AND WEAKEN OR
DESTROY STRUCTURES.
IF YOU SEE THE OCEANWATER PULL BACK
AND EXPOSE THE SEA FLOOR, RUN TO HIGH
GROUND AS FAST AS YOU CAN BECAUSE A
TSUNAMIWILL STRIKE INAFEWMOMENTS. IF
YOU ARE NOT IN A TSUNAMI IMPACT AREA,
STAY AWAY. ONCE YOU ARE IN A SAFE
LOCATION, STAY THERE UNTIL ADVISED
BY OFFICIALS THAT IT IS SAFE TO LEAVE.
KEEP LISTENING TO YOUR LOCAL MEDIA
AND EMERGENCY OFFICIALS FOR MORE
INFORMATION AND ADDITIONAL UPDATES.
IF AVAILABLE, REFER TO TSUNAMI.GOV FOR
MORE INFORMATION.
THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 30
MINUTES OR SOONER.
Message 3: Constrained, 140-Character Tsunami
Message
Emergency Alert.
@NWS EUREKA.
EVACUATE COASTAL AREAS IN MENDO-
CINO, HUMBOLDT, DEL NORTE COUNTIES.
TSUNAMI WARNING. DESTRUCTIVE WAVES
SIGHTED. WARNING EXPIRES 9:00 p.m. PDT.
Message 4. EPPM-Enhanced, Sequenced Tsunami
Message
Emergency Alert
NWS EUREKA, CA. TSUNAMI WARNING. A
MAGNITUDE 8.9 EARTHQUAKE OCCURRED
NEAR JAPAN AT 11:46 p.m. PST JULY 24, 2015.
(MESSAGE 1 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
INITIALWAVESWEREDETECTEDAT 0830 a.m.
PDT JUL 25, 2015. DOCKS HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED AT CRESCENT CITY HARBOR.
(MESSAGE 2 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
DAMAGING WAVES HAVE BEEN SIGHTED
IN HUMBOLDT BAY AND MOVING UP THE
MAD RIVER. OTHER WAVES WILL STRIKE
OVER MANY HOURS AND MAY BE DEADLY.
(MESSAGE 3 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
THE TSUNAMI WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR
DEL NORTE, HUMBOLDT and MENDOCINO
COUNTY COASTAL AREAS INCLUDING
CRESCENT CITY, KLAMATH, EUREKA and
ARCATA (MESSAGE 4 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IFYOUAREONORNEARABEACH INALOW
LYING COASTAL OR RIVER TSUNAMI IMPACT
AREA, GO NOW TO HIGH GROUND AT LEAST
50 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL (MESSAGE 5 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU ARE IN AN IMPACT AREA AND
CANNOT REACH HIGH GROUND, GO TO AN
UPPER FLOOR OF A TALL BUILDING. STAY
OFF BEACHES. DO NOT USE WATERCRAFT.
(MESSAGE 6 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
TSUNAMI WAVES MAY BE FILLED WITH
DEBRIS, WHICH CAN INJURE OR KILL PEOPLE
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AND WEAKEN OR DESTROY STRUCTURES.
(MESSAGE 7 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU SEE THE OCEANWATER PULL BACK
AND EXPOSE THE SEA FLOOR, RUN TO HIGH
GROUND AS FAST AS YOU CAN BECAUSE A
TSUNAMI IS ABOUT TO STRIKE (MESSAGE 8
OF 11)
Emergency Alert
IF YOU ARE NOT IN A TSUNAMI IMPACT
AREA, STAY AWAY. ONCE YOU ARE IN A SAFE
LOCATION, STAY THERE UNTIL OFFICIALS
ADVISE IT IS SAFETOLEAVE. (MESSAGE9OF 11)
Emergency Alert
LISTEN TO YOUR LOCAL MEDIA AND
EMERGENCY OFFICIALS FOR ADDITIONAL
TSUNAMI UPDATES. IF AVAILABLE, REFER
TO TSUNAMI.GOV FORMORE INFORMATION
(MESSAGE 10 OF 11)
Emergency Alert
TSUNAMI WARNING MESSAGES WILL BE
UPDATED EVERY 30 MINUTES OR SOONER.
(MESSAGE 11 OF 11)
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